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► ► Examine the performance of a voluntary bycatch  Examine the performance of a voluntary bycatch 
avoidance program among EBS trawlers. avoidance program among EBS trawlers.
  Institutional framework: common property quotas Institutional framework: common property quotas
► ► Did membership in the program alter:  Did membership in the program alter: 
  Bycatch outcomes (reduced form modeling)? Bycatch outcomes (reduced form modeling)?
  Bycatch Bycatch- -influencing behaviors (spatial structural  influencing behaviors (spatial structural 
modeling)? modeling)?
► ► Key feature: before/after data and  Key feature: before/after data and 
participant/non participant/non- -participant vessels participant vessels► ► Comprised of ~20 catcher Comprised of ~20 catcher- -processor vessels processor vessels
  Owned by ~10 companies Owned by ~10 companies
  100 100- -225 ft. in length 225 ft. in length
  Conduct limited onboard processing  Conduct limited onboard processing 
  Utilize non Utilize non- -selective bottom trawl gear  selective bottom trawl gear 
► ► Regulated by a complex system of time/area  Regulated by a complex system of time/area 
closures,  retention restrictions and common  closures,  retention restrictions and common 
property catch & bycatch quotas on: property catch & bycatch quotas on:
  Target Species: yellowfin, rock and flathead sole, cod,  Target Species: yellowfin, rock and flathead sole, cod, 
rockfish rockfish
  Prohibited Species: Pacific halibut and some crab  Prohibited Species: Pacific halibut and some crab 
species  species 
The EBS Head The EBS Head- -and and- -Gut Trawl Fishery Gut Trawl FisheryCommon Property Bycatch Quotas Common Property Bycatch Quotas
► ► Prohibited species catch (PSC)  Prohibited species catch (PSC) must must be discarded be discarded
► ► Regulators curtail the retention of target species  Regulators curtail the retention of target species 
when PSC quotas are exceeded    when PSC quotas are exceeded   
► ► Spatial co Spatial co- -occurrence of target and bycatch  occurrence of target and bycatch 
species makes avoidance costly species makes avoidance costly
  Avoidance costs are personally born but the benefits are  Avoidance costs are personally born but the benefits are 
diffuse across the fleet diffuse across the fleet
► ► Result: a  Result: a “ “race for bycatch race for bycatch” ”
  Abbott & Wilen (forthcoming) Abbott & Wilen (forthcoming)Annual Catch and Quota of BSAI Yellowfin Sole
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Quota Catch Quota Utilization
21,000x$530/mt 
= $11 millionHalibut: PSC Quota and Catch for Yellowfin Sole Trawl Fishery
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Quota Catch % Quota UtilizationThe  The “ “Voluntary Voluntary” ” Solution: Sea State Solution: Sea State
► ►
 
In 1995, a group of fishermen retained Sea State Inc. to  In 1995, a group of fishermen retained Sea State Inc. to 
provide near real provide near real- -time updates on bycatch rates for the  time updates on bycatch rates for the 
yellowfin and rock sole fisheries. yellowfin and rock sole fisheries.
► ►
 
Participating fishermen were given a daily spatial summary  Participating fishermen were given a daily spatial summary 
of bycatch rates in the fishery. of bycatch rates in the fishery.
  Anonymous, but only partially Anonymous, but only partially
► ►
 
Fishermen could use the information to avoid bycatch  Fishermen could use the information to avoid bycatch “ “hot  hot 
spots spots” ” and pressure other fishermen to do the same.    and pressure other fishermen to do the same.   
► ►
 
Important: a small number of vessels (from one company)  Important: a small number of vessels (from one company) 
did not participate did not participate in Sea State until ~1999.    in Sea State until ~1999.   Did Sea State work? Did Sea State work?
► ►Some early successes Some early successes
  Seven Seven- -fold decrease in red king crab bycatch in  fold decrease in red king crab bycatch in 
1995 (Gauvin, Haflinger and Nerini, 1995) 1995 (Gauvin, Haflinger and Nerini, 1995)
  Little discussion of results for Pacific halibut Little discussion of results for Pacific halibut
► ►We examine this question in several ways We examine this question in several ways
  Outcome based Outcome based (quasi (quasi- -experimental methods) experimental methods)
  Behavior based Behavior based (structural modeling of fishing  (structural modeling of fishing 
location choice) location choice)Data Data
► ► North Pacific Observer Database 1992 North Pacific Observer Database 1992- -2000 2000
  All vessels over 124 feet must carry an observer on all trips. All vessels over 124 feet must carry an observer on all trips.
  Observers record the precise spatial location and duration of  Observers record the precise spatial location and duration of 
each haul. each haul.
  A random sub A random sub- -sample is selected for species sample is selected for species- -composition  composition 
sampling (including bycatch species) sampling (including bycatch species)
  The sampling of hauls is designed to minimize incentive  The sampling of hauls is designed to minimize incentive 
problems and measurement error. problems and measurement error.
► ► Final sample Final sample
  1992 to 2000, April to November  1992 to 2000, April to November 
  18 vessels with 100% observer coverage 18 vessels with 100% observer coverage
  2784 vessel 2784 vessel- -weeks in sample weeks in sample“ “Difference in Differences Difference in Differences” ”
► ►
 
The  The average average “ “treatment effect treatment effect” ” 
of the program is the change in  of the program is the change in 
the  the bycatch bycatch rate for the  rate for the “ “treated treated” ” 
vessels minus the change in the  vessels minus the change in the 
bycatch bycatch rate for the  rate for the “ “control control” ” 
(non Sea State) vessels (non Sea State) vessels
► ►
 
Assumptions Assumptions
  Treatment and control groups  Treatment and control groups 
are temporally stable are temporally stable
  Treatment and control groups  Treatment and control groups 
must be  must be “ “similar similar” ”
  The assignment of the treatment  The assignment of the treatment 
must be  must be “ “exogenous exogenous” ”
Time
Mean 
Bycatch
Rate
Pre Post
Control Group
Treatment 
Group
Treatment 
EffectA  A “ “Modified DID Modified DID” ” Approach Approach
► ► We alter the specification to allow for We alter the specification to allow for
  Year specific treatment effects Year specific treatment effects
  Vessel characteristics Vessel characteristics
► ► We estimate 3 variations on the model We estimate 3 variations on the model
  Model 1  Model 1 – – as above as above
  Model 2  Model 2 – – seasonal effects seasonal effects
  Model 3  Model 3 – – vessel specific intercepts vessel specific intercepts
► ► The standard errors are robust to vessel The standard errors are robust to vessel- -specific  specific 
heteroskedasticity heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation  , contemporaneous correlation 
across vessels and AR(1) correlation within panels across vessels and AR(1) correlation within panelsDID Results DID ResultsDID  DID – – Beyond the Mean Beyond the Mean
► ► There are reasons to be dissatisfied with these  There are reasons to be dissatisfied with these 
results: results:
  The conditional mean may not describe  The conditional mean may not describe “ “typical typical” ”
bycatch bycatch behavior. behavior.
  Linear regression is sensitive to outliers. Linear regression is sensitive to outliers.
  The effect of Sea State could operate on other aspects  The effect of Sea State could operate on other aspects 
of the  of the bycatch bycatch distribution. distribution.
► ► To examine these possibilities we estimate DID  To examine these possibilities we estimate DID 
specifications of the conditional  specifications of the conditional quantiles quantiles. .
  Censored  Censored quantile quantile regression  regression 
► ► Result: the mean results are mirrored by the  Result: the mean results are mirrored by the 
entire distribution of outcomes. entire distribution of outcomes.“ “Outcome Based Outcome Based” ” Methods  Methods – – 
Limitations Limitations
► ►Bycatch Bycatch rates represent the interface of  rates represent the interface of 
fishermen fishermen’ ’s preferences  s preferences and and the biological,  the biological, 
economic and regulatory constraints they  economic and regulatory constraints they 
face. face.
► ►Output based methods run the risk of  Output based methods run the risk of 
confounding outcomes and incentives confounding outcomes and incentives
► ►Answer: explicitly model the short Answer: explicitly model the short- -run  run 
margin of  margin of bycatch bycatch avoidance avoidance
  Spatial choice Spatial choice 
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A Random Utility Model of Fishing  A Random Utility Model of Fishing 
Location Location
► ►
 
Short run profitability and catch composition are primarily  Short run profitability and catch composition are primarily 
driven by the decision of where to fish. driven by the decision of where to fish.
► ►
 
We represent the expected utility of a particular site ( We represent the expected utility of a particular site (n n) for  ) for 
a particular haul of the net ( a particular haul of the net (t t) as:  ) as: 
Expected 
revenues per 
standardized 
hour of 
towing
Expected 
halibut bycatch
 
(kg) per 
standardized 
hour of towing 
Control 
variables 
Distance from 
current location 
Unobserved 
factors Random Utility, cont. Random Utility, cont.
► ►λ λ/ /β β=the  =the “ “shadow cost shadow cost” ” of  of bycatch bycatch
  The implicit willingness to avoid  The implicit willingness to avoid bycatch bycatch
revealed by fishermen revealed by fishermen’ ’s spatial tradeoffs s spatial tradeoffs
► ►By  By parameterizing parameterizing λ λ
 
using the  using the “ “difference in  difference in 
differences differences” ” approach we can examine the  approach we can examine the 
effect of Sea State on fishermen effect of Sea State on fishermen’ ’s tradeoff  s tradeoff 
incentives incentivesResults ResultsSummary Summary
► ► No detectable incentive effect of Sea State from  No detectable incentive effect of Sea State from 
1995 1995- -1997 1997
► ► Structural modeling suggests  Structural modeling suggests incentives   incentives  to avoid  to avoid 
halibut markedly  halibut markedly decreased decreased  for Sea State  for Sea State 
participants from 1998 onward participants from 1998 onward
► ► Strong upward trend in  Strong upward trend in bycatch bycatch rates by SS  rates by SS 
participants in late 1990s is linked to a reduction in  participants in late 1990s is linked to a reduction in 
the implicit value of halibut  the implicit value of halibut bycatch bycatch
  Reason: 30% decline in  Reason: 30% decline in yellowfin yellowfin prices between  prices between 
1997/1998 1997/1998
► ► The reduced form and structural models are  The reduced form and structural models are 
consistent & complementary. consistent & complementary.Why did Sea State fail?  Why did Sea State fail? 
► ►Several hypotheses:  Several hypotheses: 
  Weak target fish prices (Holland &  Weak target fish prices (Holland & Ginter Ginter, 2001) , 2001)
► ►Doesn Doesn’ ’t explain lackluster 1995 t explain lackluster 1995- -1997 performance 1997 performance
  Increased halibut abundance Increased halibut abundance
► ►Doesn Doesn’ ’t explain lackluster 1995 t explain lackluster 1995- -1997 performance 1997 performance
  Predatory behavior by (former) non Predatory behavior by (former) non- -participants  participants 
( (Gauvin Gauvin,  , Haflinger Haflinger &  & Nerini Nerini, 1995) , 1995)
► ►Just not supported by the data Just not supported by the dataWhy did Sea State fail? Why did Sea State fail?
► ►Noncooperative Noncooperative incentives under  incentives under 
management institutions were simply too  management institutions were simply too 
strong to support voluntary cooperation strong to support voluntary cooperation
► ►Problem: the success of Sea State for red  Problem: the success of Sea State for red 
king crab  king crab bycatch bycatch avoidance avoidance
  Preliminary results using zero Preliminary results using zero- -inflated count  inflated count 
models indicate a 40% reduction in crab  models indicate a 40% reduction in crab 
bycatch bycatch. .
  Red king crab is managed under common  Red king crab is managed under common 
property quotas just like halibut. property quotas just like halibut.What makes RKC different? What makes RKC different?
► ►Fishery is spatially concentrated Fishery is spatially concentrated
  Lowers monitoring and enforcement costs of  Lowers monitoring and enforcement costs of 
cooperative behavior. cooperative behavior.
► ►Fishery is short lived Fishery is short lived
► ►Large benefits from  Large benefits from bycatch bycatch avoidance avoidance
  Rock sole roe is a valuable export product Rock sole roe is a valuable export product
► ►Spatiotemporal nature of RKC abundance Spatiotemporal nature of RKC abundance
  Highly mobile & spatially clustered (Dew, 2007) Highly mobile & spatially clustered (Dew, 2007)Conclusion Conclusion
► ► The apparent failure of cooperative halibut  The apparent failure of cooperative halibut 
bycatch bycatch avoidance seems to lie in two factors avoidance seems to lie in two factors
  Bad incentives from the management structure of the  Bad incentives from the management structure of the 
fishery fishery
  The characteristics of the fishery itself The characteristics of the fishery itself
► ► This suggests that policies aimed at sustaining  This suggests that policies aimed at sustaining 
cooperative management of resource stocks must  cooperative management of resource stocks must 
consider both institutional constraints and the  consider both institutional constraints and the 
constraints posed by nature itself.   constraints posed by nature itself.  